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“The personal is political science”: Epistemological and Methodological Issues in Feminist 
Social Science Research on Prostitution 
 






Unlike academic and policy discussions over enduring and pervasive social problems like 
poverty or ill health, which focus on how they should be tackled, debates concerning individuals 
in prostitution are divided over how, and to what extent, prostitution even is a problem. This has 
led to apparently intractable disagreement over the legitimate representation of a subject at the 
juncture between vulnerable invisibility and liberated agency. Concretely, this raises a paradox 
whereby feminist researchers, seeking to facilitate emancipation through the illumination of the 
experiences of a stigmatised and invisible subject, must carefully give voice to the voiceless 
without speaking on their behalf. Drawing on contemporary feminist scholarship on prostitution, 
this essay argues that, to begin resolving this paradox, the field must explicitly engage with the 
underlying epistemological and methodological implications of conducting emancipatory social 
science research on prostitution. The essay concludes that, in order to contribute meaningfully to 
the feminist research agenda on prostitution, practitioners must acknowledge the inherently 
political nature of emancipation, as the expression of choice and power. 
 




Few social phenomena continue to oppose policymakers and researchers in their 
normative stances and empirical findings as much as commercial sex. Indeed, research on 
pornography, striptease, and prostitution, is fraught with antagonistic claims to legitimate 
representation of the issue, the people involved, and the solutions required. This essay argues 
that the antagonisms within social science research on prostitution are due to more than the 
subject matter’s inherent complexity and incommensurability. Rather, we may owe much of the 
issue’s intractability to a lack of explicit engagement with feminist knowledge politics, and to the 
epistemological and methodological variety that exists among feminist researchers. There is, as 
yet, little in the way of explicit discussion of what we hold science, and our role as scientists, to 
be in this domain. As a result, we are confronted to a paradox, which has yet to be adequately 
addressed in the literature, whereby we concurrently strive to actualize the emancipatory 
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potential of our knowledge without, in so doing, speaking on the behalf of a voiceless and 
invisible other. 
Thirty years after Patti Lather set out to explore “what it means to do research in an 
unjust world” (1986, 257), the world is still unjust and people are still undertaking research. By 
unpicking the politics of research on prostitution, this essay is a tentative and preliminary 
incursion into whether, and how, we can use research to align action and meaning in a non-
oppressive manner. In light of the persistence of existing power and resource imbalances, the 
emergence of new relational dynamics, and the complexification of our understanding of both, 
this essay is therefore an invitation to reedit Lather’s reflection, and consider what research in an 
unjust world means today, at the dawn of a new millennium. In a first instance, the puzzlingly 
fraught nature of research on prostitution is evinced and presented as evidence of a scientific 
project at the juncture between politics and meaning. In a second instance, the implications and 
challenges raised by the epistemological and methodological choices made in the domain are 
discussed. In particular, in light of the desire to align progressive and emancipatory action with 
the knowledge created by research on prostitution, the place of reflexivity and activism in 
research is problematised as praxis rather than intellectual license for deploying an oppressive 
subjectivity. Finally, presenting examples from the literature, the particular risk of emancipatory 
intentions being co-opted by an oppressive and reductionist appeal to the oppressed’s ‘false 
consciousness’ is examined. The essay concludes firstly that the rigor and relevance of feminist 
social science research on commercial sex should be more authoritatively predicated on 
sustained, coherent and explicit engagement with our epistemological choices. Secondly, the 
essay suggests that feminist researchers should fight to establish these objectives as the 
incontrovertible yardstick of emancipatory research and the precondition for continued dialogue 




What drives both political and research debates on the issue of prostitution is the concern 
that it is a problematic ‘real world’ phenomenon that endures and eludes control, leading to grave 
injustices and criminal excesses. However, unlike debates over other enduring and pervasive 
injustices like poverty or ill health, which primarily concern how they should be tackled, debates 
over prostitution are fraught and fractured over exactly how, and to what extent, it even is a 
problem. This disagreement over the meaning and consequences of prostitution is reflected in the 
variety and divergence of policies addressing it. There is broad consensus on three main types of 
national prostitution policy regimes: prohibitionism, which criminalises all parties involved in 
prostitution; regulationism, which criminalises the coercive exploitation of sex workers but 
regulates the consensual provision of sexual services and the employment of sex workers; and, 
abolitionism, where the provision of sexual services is not criminalised, for the sake of not 
punishing individuals in prostitution—conceptualised as victims of gender violence and 
inequality—but the profiting from the prostitution of others, however, is. 
The normative positions and policy preferences foregrounded in the political and research 
debates follow the fault lines that arose during the ‘sex wars’ of the 1980s, which opposed 
feminist movements on the possibility for women to express consent and agency in their 
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sexuality under conditions of oppression (Showden, 2009). Over time, two broad but 
antagonistic positions have come to dominate the debate over what prostitution is, and what 
should be done about it. One perspective, rooted in radical feminism, considers prostitution to be 
an inherently violent expression of men’s domination and exploitation of women which can 
never be consented to; the other, so called ‘sex-radical’ or liberal perspective, considers that in 
certain cases prostitution can be consented to and, therefore, that it deserves destigmatisation 
and/or recognition as a form of labour. In reality, these positions can be considered ideal types, 
with political actors, activists, and researchers expressing ideas and policy preferences that tend 
more towards one conception or the other. The combination of ‘real world’ concern and ongoing 
debate over meaning and governance has lent research on the subject a tone of uncharacteristic 
intractability and vociferous activism. This propensity frustrates traditional conceptions of 
science as neutral and progressively collaborative. This challenge has yet to be adequately 
addressed as a potential obstacle to the development of scholarship—and policy—on the matter. 
Considering the apparent interrelation and undeniable similarities between positions 
staked in research on prostitution and the social and political ideas that dominate the governance 
of the issue, one possible explanation for the strident dissonance across both is simply that there 
is something particular about prostitution that makes its study and its politics accordingly unique. 
Across the board, the debate features “the lack of robust policy theory, the confusion around core 
concepts, the persistent lack and […] disinterest of key actors in reliable data, the prominence of 
ideology in formulating prostitution policy, the impatience of policy makers with the 
implementation of formulated policies, the abrupt swings in policy course, and the absence of an 
international community of experts” associated with morality politics (Wagenaar and Altink, 
2012, 281). In light of the particularity of the issue, perhaps the cantankerousness of the current 
research debate is to be expected. 
To attribute similarities between the politics and the research to their respective reflection 
of the issue’s intrinsic complexity and intractability is to acknowledge the constituting and 
constituted nature of research. This perspective considered scientific research to be but one mode 
of meaning production interwoven with myriad others, which all react to the same properties of 
the matter at hand, in this case:  disagreement over foundational values. Consequently, the 
politics and meanings of prostitution continue to reflect and perpetuate each other. This argument 
foregrounds the interrelation between the politics of prostitution and academic research on the 
subject. Research does not happen in a vacuum, but rather in a complex environment of 
opportunities and constraints. Indeed, professional and institutional dispositions, such as 
dominant research paradigms or disciplinary ‘schools’ of thought, and socio-economic 
conjuncture, such as funding and the salience of particular research issues for politicians and 
citizens over time, all contribute to shaping the production of research knowledge. 
However, the weakness of this perspective is that it explains away the politics of 
prostitution as determined by the issue without addressing the puzzle of why it continues to 
matter to us. Indeed, to assert that research is a reflection of an issue’s inherent properties—real 
or supposed—is not to explain anything but rather implies a choice regarding our capacity to 
ascertain the ultimate ‘truth’ of an issue, and react accordingly through governance. The fact is 
that, regardless of the difficulties linked to the study and discussion of prostitution, we continue 
to study and discuss it. On the one hand, we can believe, as positivists do, that there is an 
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objective reality that exists outside of those observing it, and that, if we look hard and close 
enough at it, we may gain insight into what it means and what we ought to do about it. On the 
other hand, we can believe that reality is what each observer makes of it, and that the intrinsic 
worth of unpicking the power relations undergirding an issue lies in it predicating faithful 
representations of the lived experience of the phenomenon, and the legitimacy of subsequent 
action to be undertaken. 
 
 
Feminism(s) and Science(s) 
It is precisely in the context of growing critiques of the appropriateness and adequacy of 
positivism for grasping the complexity of social phenomena that the aspirations of feminist 
social science research, which makes up the bulk of contemporary research on prostitution 
policy, evolved. In particular, feminists argued that the natural science model aspired to by the 
social and political sciences at the time had a predilection for indefensible claims to universal 
truths about a putatively “objective” reality (Ackerly and True, 2010; Acker, Barry and Esseveld, 
1983, Haraway, 1988). Further, science was considered to be rooted in a sexist and androcentric 
research paradigm that had an insidious tendency to reproduce patterns of subjugation and 
exclusion (Ackerly and True, 2010; Acker, Barry and Esseveld, 1983, Haraway, 1988; Lather, 
1986). Thus, the crux of “the science question in feminism,” like all epistemological inquiry, 
concerns the purpose of science in light of the perceived nature of ‘reality’ (Harding, 1986). 
Specifically, it seeks to address whether “it is possible to use for emancipatory ends, sciences 
that are apparently so intimately involved in Western, bourgeois, and masculine projects” 
(Harding, 1986, 9). This has prompted the advent of a social ‘science’ that privileges conjectures 
rather than claims of universal ‘truths.’ As a result, Lather argues that we have witnessed a 
transition from the dominant positivist conceptions of science that postulates the possibility and 
desirability of separation between researcher and researched towards an understanding that the 
cognitive and normative frameworks held by the researcher can influence the research itself 
(1986). 
Current feminist social science research on the politics of prostitution straddles two types 
of feminist epistemologies. Feminist empiricism accepts the existence of a reality independent 
from those who observe it, and considers sexist and androcentrist biases that can be obviated by 
the twin safeguards of methodological rigor (strict and systematic adherence to methods of 
observation and measurement) and neutrality (the elimination of the observer’s own perspective) 
in order to come to a faithful and reproducible account of the ‘real.’ Feminist standpoint theories 
instead posit a mediated reality structured by the observer’s own identity and position, and strive 
to develop contingent truths to counter the distorting effects of an uncritical acceptance of the 
ideologically corrupted dominant (sexist and androcentric) perspectives. Overall, most of the 
social science work on the topic of prostitution is concerned with putting forward faithful 
accounts of situations and social phenomena rather than to formulate predictions (Acker, Barry 
and Esseveld, 1983). Nevertheless, some of that same work also appears to make problematic 
universal truth claims on the back of standpoint theories. More than analytic eclecticism, this 
practice points to a possible cherry-picking of epistemological and methodological elements 
from divergent perspectives. 
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Thus, elements of empiricism that pervade current scholarship on prostitution tend to 
revolve around data collection protocols and inference. Indeed, while considering prostitution as 
a particular type of policy issue may be an exercise in conceptual taxonomy, the methodological 
implications of its purported distinctiveness are quite significant. Indeed, beyond the undeniable 
complexity of social phenomena that makes teasing out causality and meaning difficult in 
general, research on issues characterized by stigma and/or illicitness faces further challenges to 
establishing the validity of inferences made from data (Lee and Rezentti, 1990). This is 
particularly true when it comes to making numbers speak. In light of the considerable obstacles 
and/or disincentives (eg. shame or fear of reprisals) to self-identifying as part of a stigmatized or 
vulnerable group and, as a corollary, to participate in research, it is often fairly assumed that a 
large number of individuals of the sample population remain invisible in the final data set, and 
that those who do manage to overcome the obstacles may not be representative of the whole 
population. Difficulties in determining and accessing populations have led to substantial 
discrepancies in data across the area, which further compounds the challenges posed to 
inference. 
However, there remains a paradox whereby, while many researchers grasp the 
particularly slippery nature of data—especially quantitative data—in this domain (whether it be 
population estimates (Kempadoo 2003) or sample representativeness (Phetherson 1990)), such 
data is still recurrently used to inform on the nature and characteristics of the issue under study. 
Kempadoo highlights this puzzling practice when she states that: “To any conscientious social 
scientists, such discrepancies should be cause for extreme suspicion of the reliability of the 
research, yet when it comes to sex work and prostitution, few eyebrows are raised and the figures 
are easily bandied without question” (2003, 144). The crux of the problem is that reliability and 
validity can only be discussed relative to the types of knowledge claims being made. Because the 
epistemological nature and concomitant theoretical scope of the claims being made in research 
on prostitution are rarely explicit, we have reached a degree of intractability that threatens a war 
of attrition over the meaning of what we are observing. In this sense, perhaps the reason why we 
have trouble finding ourselves—through shared observations and conclusions—in the work of 
some others, is that none of us are being particularly clear about what we think we are looking at, 
or about what kind of meaning we are seeking to ascertain. 
 
 
Emancipation as Praxis 
Arguably, the reason why we are willing to grapple with inferential convention is because 
we, as feminist social scientists, have a stake in the type of knowledge we are trying to develop. 
Indeed, building on the work of feminist scientists and philosophers of science such as Evelyn 
Fox-Keller (1985), Sandra Harding (1986) and Donna Haraway (1988), the quest for knowledge 
has evolved to accommodate the search for “emancipatory knowledge,” that is to say knowledge 
which lays bare the complex network of power and meaning otherwise hidden by everyday 
practices and uncritically shared understandings (Lather, 1986, 259). The emancipatory power of 
this knowledge lies in its twin, and inherently linked, potentials: to illuminate and, in so doing, 
reveal pathways to transformation. In this sense, by developing as an iteration of, and dialectic 
between, theory and practices, feminist social science is research as praxis. Indeed, the idea that 
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theory is practice is intrinsic to feminist research (Ackerly and True, 2010). Lather posits that 
research anchored in this project is one that is intrinsically committed to critiquing and 
counterweighing the status quo by adopting a critical stance in the aim of building a more fair 
and equal society (1986). 
For emancipatory research, the act of conducting research in itself offers an immediacy of 
praxis, by presenting opportunities for the careful consideration of our understandings of, and 
role in, particular situations (Lather, 1986). In order to better realize the praxis of empirical 
research, emancipatory research has devised its own toolbox of techniques including the 
submission of preliminary findings for response and scrutiny by the researched subject, and the 
use of life-histories as consciousness-raising tools and gateways to understanding. The aim of 
these techniques is to aid us in both overcoming the tendency for research to objectify the 
researched by affording them equal subject status in the process, and to account for ourselves in 
the reality we are engaging with. The translation of the epistemological choices we make into 
research practice is contingent on reflexivity. In feminist research, we therefore use reflexivity as 
a means of dispelling the “god-trick” (Maxey, 1999, 201) of a putatively objective and universal 
knowledge serving to mask the (re)production of patriarchal domination (Haraway, 1988; 
Harding, 1986). Reflexivity, in this sense, is a channel through which to discover and raise our 
own consciousness, and is used to dispel scientists’ illusion that “as long as they are not 
conscious of any bias or political agenda, they are neutral and objective, when in fact they are 
only unconscious” (Namenwirth, 1986: 29). Consequently, one of the principal embodiments of 
research as praxis in feminist social science is activism. The logical transition from reflexivity to 
activism stems from the understanding that power relations are not fixed and objective social fact 
that can be avoided once identified, but rather relational and fluid, and that they involve us 
whether we like it or not (Maxey, 1999). If we cannot choose to operate outside of power 
relations, we can however, elect to engage actively with them—a process which leads to greater 
personal and societal understanding and empowerment (Maxey, 1999). 
 
 
The Problem of False Consciousness 
 Nevertheless, while critical approaches to social science have turned to reflexivity as a 
means of overcoming insidious and pervasive relations of oppression, working with the 
assumption that an individual can be simultaneously fully aware of both their own 
subconsciousness and of the contextual power nexus they figure in, may be just as problematic as 
a failure to engage reflexively at all (Maxey, 1999). In this sense, uncritically deploying a 
reflexive discourse—being unreflexively reflexive—can also serve to mask and perpetuate unjust 
power relations. Reflexivity and activism are practices, not justifications. Being aware of our 
own partiality does not dispense us from establishing the rigor and relevance of our practices 
(Lather, 1986; Maxey, 1999). 
In particular, one of the difficulties of being immersed in reflexive meaning is that we 
risk drowning out the competing visions of others in our haste to articulate meaning and action. 
Lather discusses this challenge of articulating world-changing meaning from subjects who, like 
the researcher, are partial and situated: 
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Sole reliance on the participants’ perceptions of their situation is misguided 
because, as neo-Marxists point out, false consciousness and ideological 
mystification may be present. A central challenge to the interpretive paradigm is 
to recognize that reality is more than negotiated accounts—that we are both 
shaped by and shapers of our world. For those interested in the development of a 
praxis-oriented research paradigm, a key issue revolves around this central 
challenge: how to maximize the researcher’s mediation between people’s self-
understandings (in light of the need for ideological critique) and transformative 
social action without becoming impositional. (1986, 269 [emphasis in original]) 
 
The risk of imposition evinces a paradox in emancipatory research whereby in order to embody 
theory “adequate to the task of changing the world,” we must individually articulate action based 
on inferences made from, and about, an ultimately unknowable other, who does not (and cannot) 
tessellate entirely with our partial and positioned understandings (Lather, 1986, p. 262). 
Frequently, in fact, the people we think we share some commonality with elude us in some 
fundamental way. The challenge arises when dissonant behavior is considered to be part of the 
power dynamics that perpetuate oppression. Thus, the consciousness of certain individuals in 
situations of subjugation is conceptualized as “false” when it reflects and serves to secure and 
reproduce the interests of the oppressors instead of their own (Jost, 1995). Therefore, on the one 
hand, authoritative claims of oppression and injustice, which are in themselves expression of the 
researcher’s power, are said to be asserted rather than imposed on, to avoid transforming the 
subjects of the research, and intended beneficiaries of the emancipatory project, into “objects of 
scrutiny and manipulation” (Acker, Barry and Esseveld, 1983, 425). On the other hand, the 
inclusion of those who behave in a manner that seems contrary to their putative interests is 
sometimes justified by imposing a reading of false consciousness on their behavior and 
experiences. 
One solution to this tension is to anchor the emancipatory aspirations of feminist research 
on a logic of consciousness raising rather than on a more problematic logic of imposed 
liberation. Marx and Engels defined emancipation-as-consciousness-raising as liberating people 
“from the chimeras, the ideas, the dogmas, the imaginary beings under the yoke of which they 
are pining away” (1846/1970, 37). From this perspective, emancipation would arise from the 
recognition, by oppressed individuals, of their subordination and their subsequent development 
of action against it. However, Jost argues that, to a certain extent, feminist emancipatory social 
science is premised on the belief that Marx and Engels may have been too optimistic about the 
capacities of individuals to recognize and take action against their oppression (1995). Science 
and research must therefore be deployed in aid, in the form of raising consciousnesses and 
empowering people to be agents of change in their own lives (Jost, 1995). 
The problem lies in keeping an ethical distance between the consciousness-raising 
aspirations of an emancipatory endeavour, and the temptation to read behaviors we find puzzling 
or problematic as expressions of an individual or group’s ‘false consciousness.’ This tension is 
particularly prominent in feminist scholarship concerned with responses to phenomena with 
potential traumatic psychological consequences, such as domestic violence, rape, and 
participation in the sex trade, since these present the recurrent puzzle of individuals displaying 
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reticence to leave behind harmful or abusive social situations (Jost, 1995). Thus, while 
consciousness-raising has traditionally been, and continues to be, an essential element of feminist 
action (Acker, Barry and Esseveld, 1983; Bartky, 1975; Westkott, 1979), it has often been a 
source of frustration for the women’s movement. In this sense, to paraphrase Ferguson, feminism 
as a “philosophy of liberation” has always sought to deploy both agency and subjectivity in its 
quest for emancipation (1988, 76). However, in so doing, it has had to struggle with striking the 
right balance between the two, in order to guard against imposing its own agenda and principles 
on the ones it seeks to liberate. 
 
 
Speaking for/on ‘the behalf of’ in Prostitution Research 
In contemporary research on prostitution, the risk of imposition derives from both the 
methodologically inferred and theoretically conceptualized voicelessness and invisibility of 
individuals in prostitution. For example, Melissa Farley states that:  
 
Women in prostitution are silent for many reasons. They are rarely given the 
opportunity to speak about their real lives because this would interfere with sex 
businesses. The silence of most of those in prostitution is a result of intimidation, 
terror, dissociation, and shame. Their silence, like the silence of battered women, 
should not be misinterpreted, ever, as their consent to prostitution. (2004, 1117) 
 
In light of this perceived voicelessness, the debate over representation has focused on 
establishing or dispelling the legitimacy of different groups’ claims to representing the invisible 
population. This amounts to what Epstein calls a ‘credibility struggle,’ that is to say a form of 
“contest over knowledge making” hinging on the “competition to establish knowledge claims as 
believable and their claimants as authoritative” (2006, 2). Thus, for example, Janice Raymond, a 
professor of women’s studies and medical ethics who also campaigns for the recognition of 
prostitution as a form of violence against women and who was co-director of the Coalition 
Against Trafficking in Women from 1994 to 2007, couches her distinction between US-based 
sex worker activist organizations and abolitionist groups in terms of an objective truth, referring 
to the latter as “groups who truly represent prostituted women” (1998, 4 [my emphasis]). Or yet, 
academic, social psychologist, and executive member of the International Committee for 
Prostitutes’ Rights, Gail Pheterson writes “My purpose with this article is to demonstrate how 
social science research […] is infested with prejudices against prostitute-branded women.” 
(1990, 398 [emphasis added]). 
To talk about legitimacy in representation in social science, is to hit on the problem of 
inter-subjectivity. This is the puzzle whereby, as Stanley and Wise phrase it, “in spite of our 
ontological distinctness none the less we recognize ourselves in others and they in us and can 
speak of ‘common experiences’” (1990, 23). In research, the risk of speaking on behalf of an 
oppressed other is therefore intrinsically linked to the imposition of a theoretical reading on a 
lived experience in order to render it meaningful beyond the respondent’s immediate personal 
and social world. This challenge can arise at data collection stage when having to decide whether 
or not to confront respondents with your own interpretation of their situation. This problem can 
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also arise at the level of theorization or conceptualization, when researcher ultimately retains the 
power to construct meaning inferred from the experiences of others. The tension, in both cases, 
speaks to the researcher’s ultimate power and control over the research process. Thus, the 
following passage, taken from a comprehensive review of the empirical literature on the 
harmfulness of prostitution, illustrates the possibility of conceptually reframing subject’s 
experiences in order to make them match conceptual and theoretical assumptions: 
 
It is likely that the low rape incidence reported in some studies is a result of 
unclear definitions of rape. We found in our research that even women in 
prostitution themselves assume that rape cannot occur in prostitution when, in 
fact, it occurs constantly. Future research on prostitution should behaviorally 
define rape. For example, if rape is defined as any unwanted sex act, then 
prostitution has an extremely high rate of rape because many survivors view 
prostitution as almost entirely consisting of unwanted sex acts […]. (Farley, 2004, 
1100 [emphasis added]) 
 
The risk, for Kapur, is of falling prey to a “victimizing rhetoric,” alluring because it 
affords feminist researchers a “victim subject” which challenges the dominant and 
problematically neutral and universal subject of liberal rights, and also grants them “a unitary 
subject that enables women to continue to make claims based on a commonality of experience” 
(2002, 5). However, for Kapur, the price to pay for having a unitary subject through which to 
frame emancipatory demands is an increased risk of eclipsing the subject altogether (2002). 
Kessler draws attention to the potential for victimizing individuals in research on prostitutions 
when she states: 
 
Just because someone cannot imagine why a woman would choose prostitution, 
does not mean that this is not in fact exactly what has happened. To tell women 
that their choices in this situation is always an illusion is to force victimization on 
women, many of whom are no more victims than non-prostitute women under our 
current patriarchal capitalist system. (2002, 223) 
 
In addition to its epistemological seductiveness, the victim rhetoric is a robust and 
compelling argumentative frame. Indeed, more than simply aiming to derive some common 
understanding from particular perspectives, the decision—or not—to impose a reading on 
another’s experience in a situation of perceived injustice is considered a powerful act. Contrary 
to the traditional criterion of non-imposition in emancipatory praxis (Lather, 1986), the courage 
to impose can sometimes, very problematically, be framed as ethical and righteous in a way that, 
perhaps despite itself, unthinkingly contributes to the perpetuation of injustices. Consider, for 
example, the representation of those who refuse to consider prostitution as a form of violence 
against women today as analogous to the apologists of domestic violence in the past: 
 
The ambivalence on the part of many researchers, NGOs, and governments to 
view prostitution as a form of violence against women parallels an earlier 
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disregard and neglect of the harm done to battered women on the part of those 
who believed that if women made the choice to stay with abusive husbands or 
partners then “it couldn’t be that bad.” (Raymond, 2004, 1177) 
 
The interface between knowledge, consciousness and meaning is diaphanous and 
involves problematic power dynamics. It underpins the challenge of giving meaning to the 
subject’s experience in a manner that minimizes the power differential between researcher and 
researched in a context where there is no agreement over the meaning of the experience. Donna 
Haraway calls it “our” problem when she asks: 
 
[how can we achieve] simultaneously an account of radical historical contingency 
for all knowledge claims and knowing subjects, a critical practice for recognizing 
our own “semiotic technologies” for making meaning, and a no-nonsense 
commitment to faithful accounts of a “real” world, one that can be partially shared 
and that is friendly to earthwide projects of finite freedom, adequate material 
abundance, modest meaning in suffering, and limited happiness? (1988, 579) 
 
Currently, it appears that the most significant consequence of the inability to resolve this 
issue in contemporary prostitution research is the polarization of research perspectives detracting 
from a focus on the subjects-beneficiaries of the emancipatory project. In certain cases, this 
navel-gazing is considered to negate the emancipatory potential of the research because it 
abandons the ‘view from below’ as its epistemological anchor. Thus, in her research on migrant 
women’s involvement in commercial sex in Europe, Laura Agustìn argues that “migrant 
women’s exploitation would be better understood and confronted if European supporters could 
leave their own debate behind, listen to migrants’ own voices, and include migrant women as 
equal partners in any effort to improve their situation” (2005, 98). In other cases, seeing artificial 
antagonisms and dichotomies where there may only be a loss in epistemological or theoretical 
translation can create the illusion that feminism is made up of warring factions instead of 
contrasting “means of interpretation, directions of exploration that share a great deal but none the 
less differ as to the kinds of meanings they make possible” (Ferguson, 1988, 68). In light of this, 
Kessler reminds us that we too, as feminist researchers, may get bound up in a false 
consciousness that serves neither our own liberation nor our emancipatory research goals: 
 
Everyone will certainly not agree with my opinion concerning prostitution, and 
that is fine. There is room for a multitude of views. What must stop, however, is 
the us/them, good girl/bad girl mentality that does not allow for dialogue. This is 
simply a mechanism to keep women fighting amongst themselves, rather than 
directing our action where it belongs. (2002, 234) 
 
If then, as Kapur argues, one of feminists’ key concerns is to come up with “ways in which to 
express their politics without subjugating other subjectivities through claims to the idea of “true 
self” or a singular truth about all women” (2002, 37), we perhaps are not faring as well as we had 
imagined in the area of social science research on prostitution. 
86 
Journal of International Women’s Studies  Vol. 16, No. 1  November 2014 
 
 
The Healing Process 
There is no single solution to “our” problem. Short of being able to solve the issue 
conclusively, we can choose to approach it with intellectual honesty, critical reflexivity and 
epistemological consistency. Acker, Barry, and Esseveld (1983) posit that this entails 
maintaining an awareness of when true and equal dialogue between researcher and subject can 
and cannot be achieved in the research process, and making this critical awareness explicit, in 
order to respect and celebrate both our own and our research subjects’ legitimate subjectivity. 
For Haraway, embracing both scientific rigour and the legitimacy of subjectivity in this way 
allows us to overcome the illusion that there exists an ultimate and attainable separation between 
meanings and bodies and, in so doing, “build meanings and bodies that have a chance for life” 
(1988, 580). 
If our epistemological choices entail that we be more explicitly and critically reflexive, so 
too do they require us to engage with the ethical issues concerning our practices. This amounts to 
recognizing our situatedness as researchers. This is premised on the understanding that “the 
claims of every knower reflect a particular perspective shaped by social, cultural, political and 
personal factors and that the perspective of each knower contains blind spots, tacit 
presuppositions, and prejudgments of which the individual is unaware” (Hawkesworth, 1989, 
557). This guards us against the threat of subjective emancipatory knowledge masquerading as 
unqualified ‘truth’ (Lather, 1986). Acknowledgement of situated knowledge necessarily has 
theoretical repercussions, in terms of staking out the scope and validity of claims made; 
methodological repercussions, in terms of the lens through which we choose to analyse our data; 
conceptual repercussions, in terms of the complexity which we must necessarily built into our 
constructs; and technical repercussions regarding the design of data collection protocols and the 
carrying out of fieldwork. Thus, if we are not purporting to present traditional ‘rational’ 
knowledge, or to advance claims of ‘objective truths,’ then we are obligated to acknowledge our 
position and, just as importantly, its limits. This is what, for example, Jody Freeman attempt to 
do in her discussion of the competing views in the debate on prostitution when she states: 
 
I have tried to clarify the prostitution debate for an audience that I hope will 
include prostitutes. I realize, however, that this article will probably be 
inaccessible or irrelevant to most prostitutes. Nonetheless, exposing the 
divergence in opinion on issues like this one is important because it helps 
feminists create coherent theory, which makes consistent and effective practice. It 
also clarifies the debate for those struggling to make political choices about 
reform. (1997, 211) 
 
This is the keystone to Haraway’s argument that the feminist conception of objectivity is as 
“positioned rationality” (1988, 590). Indeed, Haraway argues that if we suppose there is no 
extrinsic and objective ‘reality’ to discover, then the logic according to which we come to terms 
with and construct accounts of our world is driven instead by a contingent and power-charged 
dialectic (1988). In this sense, being clear about what we consider we can and cannot 
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functionally and ethically do not only situates our research (and us) in the world, but also 
actively situates it in the ongoing feminist dialogue. Ultimately, adopting a partial, situated 
perspective allows us to present an “embodied objectivity” necessary to sustain the variety, 
complexity and dynamism that make up the critical feminist project (Haraway, 1988). 
Conducting feminist emancipatory social science, then, is about making decision—
choices are a necessity. The execution and performance of a choice, in full consciousness, is also 
in itself an affirming and empowering act—choices are a prerogative. Moreover, to the extent 
that the discussion of epistemological and methodological choices between different feminist 
perspectives and across academic disciplines and traditions offers junctures for progress, choices 
are opportunities. Finally, conceptions of scientific adequacy and the criteria through which it 
can be measured are determined as a result of choices regarding the ordering of research 
priorities. The benchmarks of what constitutes good practice in the type of research being 
conducted must be set out prior. The question of evaluating knowledge has to be undertaken in 
the context of the purposes set out by the researcher. It follows that if the researcher conceives of 
the project as emancipatory, then the value of knowledge created can in part be gauged against 
the contribution it makes towards the further emancipation of women. Considering that an 
emancipatory objective does not guarantee an emancipatory outcome, feminist scientists find 
themselves constantly seeking to obviate the risk of their research being used against the 
intended beneficiaries, including the risks they may themselves introduce by failing to engage 
deeply with the choices they are making at every stage of the research process. In this sense, the 
risk of “rampant subjectivity,” arguably higher in the context of emancipatory knowledge, can 
only be obviated by explicit, rigorous and systematic engagement with the intricacies of 
accountability (Lather, 1986). Emancipatory social science is meaningful only as an iterative 




Current social science research on prostitution appears fraught and intractable. More than 
a factor of the inherent complexity of social phenomenon, this is evidence of a lack of 
recognition of our principles and beliefs in the research of others. The culmination of this 
cognitive and normative dissonance has given research on prostitution the image of two 
antagonistic camps waging a war of words and ideas over the monopoly of legitimate 
representation. This is particularly problematic because, for the most part, social science research 
on prostitution has committed itself to the principles and choices of feminist emancipatory social 
science. In this sense, it tends to reject the advancement of objective ‘truth’ claims as 
indefensible, and the meaningless and uncritically reproduction of historical patterns of 
domination. This makes the dissonance between the apparent consensus over the motivations and 
objectives of the emancipatory research project, and the strident disagreement over foundational 
principles seem particularly suspicious. This dissonance endures because the epistemological and 
methodological implications of a feminist social science, such as the deployment of critical 
reflexivity and the espousal of research as praxis, are not a form of absolution. Even when we 
deploy both, everything remains to be explained and justified. 
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This essay intended to raise and illustrate, rather than exhaustively discuss and 
definitively settle, some of the issues arising from conducting feminist social science on 
prostitution. There remains much to critically engage with in this research area, not least of all 
the role and implications of ontological choices in deriving feminist epistemological positions, 
the significance of the academy as the dominant locus of meaning production for emancipatory 
feminist research, and the possibility and merit of conducting non-feminist research on 
prostitution. Nevertheless, it has advanced the tentative suggestion that part of the difficulties 
and ambiguities in this domain rest on the implicitness of the choices made by researchers and 
that engaging more explicitly with these choices may help obviate some of the risks. 
Arguably, the single biggest challenge for social science research on the politics of 
prostitution that implicitly or explicitly espouse a commitment to emancipation and 
empowerment, is to strike a meaningful and ethical balance between explaining away complex 
phenomena as the infinitely particular intentions of social actors, and making problematic 
inferences about social action as a result of imposing theoretically pre-determined expectations 
and meanings. Indeed, the voicelessness of the oppressed, which is at the heart of the 
emancipatory project, paradoxically frustrates the researcher seeking to give voice to, without 
speaking on the behalf of, others. In the case of research on prostitution, this is primarily 
expressed by a heightened risk of explaining dissonant behavior as the expression of ‘false 
consciousness’ and, in so doing, victimizing rather than liberating, the oppressed. This highlights 
the political nature of emancipation, whereby aligning empowerment with a consideration for 
human agency and subjectivity—both our own, and that of the beneficiaries of our research—is 
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